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Abstract: 
 This paper attempts to investigate how information transparency affects human behavior. Thus, 
we empirically examine the influence of information disclosure ordinances on the income of 
mayors and chief executives in local governments in Japan. For the estimation, we use panel data 
of local governments covering 1999–2010, during which time many local governments 
implemented such ordinances. The key finding is that the income of mayors and chief executives 
in local governments decreased after the implementation of the ordinances. Furthermore, as the 
years passed, the income declined further. Hence, information disclosure regarding local 
government reduces the income of top officials and its influence becomes greater over time. 
Although the income of mayors and chiefs executives is open information without the need for 
an ordinance, it provided transparency regarding their work performance. Furthermore, the effect 
of the ordinance did not depend on the mayors or chief executives’ income level in 1999. 
Therefore, the reduction of income is mainly due to the government’s accountability rather than 
citizens’ inequality aversion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It has recently been reported that people’s preferences for inequality and redistribution are 
based on available information that enables them to compare their economic situation with others 
(e.g., Card et al. 2012; Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015; Karadja et al. 2017). That is, 
transparency regarding the income level of public officials can change people’s preferences for 
redistribution and income level. Such transparency may even influence policy making because 
people have a tendency of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Furthermore, 
transparency policies surrounding salaries have drawn growing public attention and have been 
examined in various countries such as the United States (Mas 2017), Canada (e.g., Gomez and 
Wald 2010; Dobrescu et al., 2014), Norway (Bø et al. 2015), China (Juang et al. 2016), and Japan 
(Hasegawa et al. 2013). Many studies also report that an increase in transparency is observed to 
reduce incomes that are subject to disclosure (Juang et al. 2016; Mas 2017).1 From the classical 
viewpoint of public choice, an innate lack of incentives to maximize profit might make 
government organizations less efficient (Buchanan and Wagner,1977). Reducing information 
asymmetry via information disclosure may incentivize a government to be more efficient. 
Consistent with this view, it is reported that the public disclosure of politicians’ incomes leads to 
lower perceived corruption and more efficient government (Djankov et al. 2010).2 It is also 
known that fiscal transparency reduces public debt and deficit (Alt and Lassen 2006). Although 
income transparency may provoke serious concerns about privacy (Hasegawa et al. 2013; Bø et 
al. 2015), it is accepted that transparency has the abovementioned benefits. 
Voter initiatives have been found to affect the pay of mayors and chief executives in local 
governments (Di Tella and Fisman 2004).3  The development of mass media is expected to 
increase voter initiatives by reducing the information asymmetry between government and 
citizens. Yazaki (2017) examined the effects of newspapers on political accountability in local 
governments in Japan. He found that newspapers contribute to local governments’ accountability 
by drawing citizens’ attention to local policy issues. An increase in the market share of local 
                                                   
1 In contrast, there have been cases where an increase in transparency resulted in 
increased disclosed income (Craighead et al. 2004; Gelinas et al. 2009). Other effects such 
as underreporting one’s income (Hasegawa et al. 2013) or deterrence (Bø et al. 2015) are 
also reported. 
2 In private firms, mandated information disclosure have been reported to increase a firm’s 
stock returns (Greenstone et al. 2006). 
3 Although the salary of regular local government officials moves in tandem to that of 
regular national government officials, which is in line with regular workers’ salaries, the 
compensation of mayors and chief executives is determined by their local councils and 
hence it differs from place to place. Thus, it is probable that voters’ opinions are reflected in 
the mayor or chief executive’s income via council discussions. 
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newspapers reduced local public works spending. Local newspapers have a greater accountability 
effect on public spending 1 year after national newspapers reported on the issue of unnecessary 
public works. This is consistent with Yamamura and Kondo’s (2013) finding that information 
disclosure ordinances decrease the rate of government construction expenditure where rent-
seeking behaviors are generally observed.    
In Japan, as pointed out by Doi and Ihori (2009, 181), “larger amounts of tax revenue are spent 
on public works than in other countries, controlling for size and population.” Therefore, it is 
possible that inefficiency is more clearly observed if there is significant expenditure. Thus, 
citizens are likely to check the role and effectiveness of government if they can obtain information 
that reflects government performance. Furthermore, since 1998, local governments in Japan have 
increasingly implemented information disclosure ordinances, with the rate of ordinance 
implementation reaching close to 100% in 2007. Such ordinances require the disclosure of official 
information to ensure accountability (Jiyukokuminsha 2009). Hence, it is of value to investigate 
how information disclosure ordinances have influenced government efficiency and how their 
effect changed in Japan during this period.  
In Japan, the incomes of mayors and chief executives in local government were revealed 
before the widely implemented ordinances.4 However, citizens may not have evaluated the extent 
to which the income of local government mayors or chief executives reflects their performance 
because information about their performance may not have been readily available. Thus, this 
setting differed from Di Tella and Fisman (2004) in their examination of the effect of the 
transparency of income of government officers. Therefore, we can consider government 
accountability rather than inequality aversion because inequality aversion causes populists to 
respond to the visibility of a mayor or chief executive’s income. We empirically examine the 
effect of information disclosure ordinances on the income level local government chief executives. 
By constructing panel data comprised of local governments in cities, towns, and villages 
throughout Japan from 1999–2010, we control for the unobservable fixed effects of local 
governments. The key finding is that the ordinance reduced the income of local government 
mayors and chief executives and its effect becomes greater as time passed. Furthermore, the 
effects do not depend on the mayor or chief executive’s initial income position. We also found 
that accountability plays greater role than inequality aversion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of 
local governments in Japan and briefly review the implementation of the information disclosure 
ordinances. We then present a theoretical model to derive our testable hypothesis in section 3. 
                                                   
4 Since 1955, data on the income of local government mayors and chief executives have 
been gathered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Local 
Administration Bureau (http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/jichi_gyousei/c-
gyousei/kyuuyo/kyuuyo_jc_1.html. Accessed on November 28, 2017). 
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Section 4 explains the data, empirical method, and our estimation results. The final section offers 
our conclusions. 
 
2. Setting  
2.1. Information disclosure ordinances  
Japan’s first information disclosure ordinance was enacted in 1982 in Kaneyama, a town with 
some thousands of residents located in northeastern Japan. Based on such ordinances, residents 
have the right to request the disclosure of information possessed by the local authorities. Hence, 
in Japan at the municipality level, that is, cities, towns, and villages, local government has played 
a leading role in disclosing public information to citizens.5  
As shown in Figure 1, the rate of implementation of information disclosure ordinances was 
about 20% in 1999, followed by a considerable increase; the rate reached nearly 100% by 2007. 
The purpose of disclosure under public information ordinances is to ensure the accountability of 
local government in municipalities such as cities, towns, and villages. Accordingly, this ordinance 
makes it easier for citizens to evaluate the performance of local governments and their chief 
executives. For instance, in the 1990s, it was sometimes reported that government officers 
claimed expenses for business trips that were never actually undertaken (Yoshimi 1997). The chief 
executive of a local government may be considered responsible for such negligence because the 
officers’ behavior were regarded at least prima facie to be under the control of the chief executive. 
As reported by Asano (2010), prior to the mid-1990s, however, information disclosure systems 
were less likely to function properly in the majority of Japan’s local authorities. However, as time 
passed, the effectiveness of these systems has improved. For example, as found by Yamamura 
and Kondo (2013), the system was eventually able to reduce rent-seeking activity. 
A cursory examination of Figure 2(a) reveals that the average monthly income of a local 
government mayor or chief executive was 860,000 yen (about US$8,600) in 1999 and has 
declined since then. In 2010, the monthly income totaled approximately 760,000 yen (about US 
$7,600). That is, the income has reduced by approximately 12% over 10 years. However, this 
trend is possibly the outcome of a macro-economic shock that has influenced the Japanese 
economy on the whole. If a macro-economic shock is the major reason, the income of other 
workers’ should have also reduced proportionally to that of mayors or chief executives. Figure 
2(b) illustrates the relative income level of chief executives (chief executive average income 
level/average income level of other government officers6). Figure 2(b) demonstrates that the 
                                                   
5 The Administrative Information Disclosure Law was enacted by the Japanese central 
government in 1999, based on the “right to know” (Muroi 1999). 
6 In contrast to a mayor or chief executive’s income, the income of a government official 
moves in tandem with other workers’ wages. Thus, the average income level of other 
government officers directly reflects economic movement. 
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relative income level of chief executives reduced from 2.65 in 1999 to 2.35 in 2010. This can be 
interpreted to state that the average income of chief executives was about 2.65 times higher than 
the average income of government officers in 1999 and was 2.35 times higher in 2010. Figure 
2(a) shows that chief executives’ incomes declined rapidly after 1999 whereas that of government 
officers has largely remained the same. Thus, we could interpret Figure 2(a) and (b) to imply that 
the performance of chief executives was over-evaluated before the implementation of the 
disclosure ordinance, partly because of a lack of information about local government performance. 
Furthermore, turning to a comparison of the distribution of the chief executives’ monthly income 
level before and after the implementation of the ordinance, Figure 3(a) clearly demonstrates that 
the income level after the implementation is lower than beforehand. Regarding the relative income 
level, a similar observation is illustrated by Figure 3(b). Considering Figures 1–3(b) jointly leads 
us to expect that the implementation of information disclosure reduced the income of chief 
executives and its impact has gradually expanded. A more formal model is presented in the 
following section.  
 
3. Theoretical model and Hypothesis 
 
The gradual decline in compensation for mayors and city council members after the 
implementation of the information disclosure ordinances can be theoretically explained using a 
probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). We briefly describe below how this 
phenomenon is understood. 
Let the number of voters at time 𝑡 at a municipality be 𝑛𝑡. Among the voters, we assume 
that 𝑚𝑡 people, indexed by 1,2,3,⋯ ,𝑚𝑡, know the disclosed information and 𝑛𝑡 −𝑚𝑡 people, 
indexed by 𝑚𝑡 + 1,𝑚𝑡 + 2,𝑚𝑡 + 3,⋯ , 𝑛𝑡, do not. We also assume 𝑛𝑡 to be constant; that is, 
𝑛𝑡 = 𝑛∀𝑡 and an odd number, just for convenience. We further assume that people gradually 
become aware of the disclosed information. Therefore, 𝑚𝑡 is a weakly increasing function with 
𝑡 when 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0, where an information disclosure ordinance is implemented at time 𝑡0, and 𝑚𝑡 
is gradually increasing; that is, ∃𝛥 > 0, ∀𝑡 > 𝑡0. Either 𝑚𝑡+∆ −𝑚𝑡 = 0 or 𝑚𝑡+∆ −𝑚𝑡 = 1 
holds. Based on these assumptions, we assume that a voter with knowledge of the disclosed 
information considers the proper compensation to be 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖 and that a voter without that 
knowledge considers it to be 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖 , where 𝑤 < 𝑤 is satisfied and 𝜀𝑖 , which reflects 
voter 𝑖’s ideology, independently follows a continuous probabilistic density function 𝑓(∙). In this 
model, we do not specify how a voter determines what he or she deems to be the proper 
compensation; proper compensation may be determined by a local government activity 
(accountability hypothesis) or by one’s envy (inequality aversion hypothesis). 7  The only 
                                                   
7 However, our model has an affinity for the accountability hypothesis rather than the 
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assumption here is that 𝑤 < 𝑤, that is, proper compensation after knowing the information is 
lower than that before knowing it. We assume that the expected value of 𝜀𝑖 is 0, no atom, and 
that 𝑓(∙)  is non-zero at least in [−
𝑤−𝑤
2
,
𝑤−𝑤
2
] . We finally assume that compensation is 
determined by the median voter’s opinion (Black 1948), that is, compensation 𝑤𝑡 is equal to the 
𝑛+1
2
th value of {𝑤𝑖𝑡|𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] ∩ 𝑁}. Under these assumptions, we can show that compensation is 
gradually decreasing. Formally, we can prove the following proposition.  
 
Proposition: Compensation is gradually decreasing if there are a sufficient number of voters. 
Formally, ∀ℎ > 0, ∀𝛿 ∈ (0, Δ], ∃𝑀 > 0  s.t. 𝑤𝑡+𝛿 −𝑤𝑡 ∈ [−ℎ, 0] almost always holds if 
both 𝑛 −𝑚𝑡 > 𝑀 and 𝑚𝑡 > 𝑀 are satisfied. 
Proof: Because we assume that 𝑚𝑡  is gradually increasing, at the most one person becomes 
aware of the disclosed information between time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝛿. If no one becomes aware of 
it during this period, 𝑤𝑡+𝛿 = 𝑤𝑡 must hold and the proof ends. Hereafter, we consider a case 
where one person becomes aware of it during that period. Let the person’s index be 𝑙 . 
Furthermore, let the 𝑘 th smallest value of {𝑤𝑖𝑡|𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] ∩ 𝑁}  be 𝑤𝑡
𝑘 . Because of the 
median voter’s theorem, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2  must hold. If 𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2 ≤ 𝑤𝑙𝑡+𝛿 < 𝑤𝑙𝑡 or 𝑤𝑙𝑡+𝛿 < 𝑤𝑙𝑡 ≤
𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2 , then 𝑤𝑡+𝛿 = 𝑤𝑡 holds. If 𝑤𝑙𝑡+𝛿 ≤ 𝑤𝑡
𝑛−1
2 ≤ 𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2 ≤ 𝑤𝑙𝑡, then 𝑤𝑡+𝛿 = 𝑤𝑡
𝑛−1
2  holds. If 
𝑤𝑡
𝑛−1
2 < 𝑤𝑙𝑡+𝛿 < 𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2 ≤ 𝑤𝑙𝑡 , then 𝑤𝑡+𝛿 = 𝑤𝑙𝑡+𝛿  holds. In sum, 𝑤𝑡+𝛿 ∈ [𝑤𝑡
𝑛−1
2 , 𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2 =
𝑤𝑡] holds. For any ∀ℎ > 0, there exists a sufficiently large 𝑀  with 𝑛 −𝑚𝑡 > 𝑀  and 
𝑚𝑡 > 𝑀, such that for any 𝑥 ∈ [−
𝑤−𝑤
2
,
𝑤−𝑤
2
], # {𝑤𝑖𝑡 ∈ [𝑥 −
ℎ
2
, 𝑥 +
ℎ
2
] |𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] ∩ 𝑁} ≥ 2 
almost always holds. Therefore, 𝑤𝑡
𝑛+1
2 −𝑤𝑡
𝑛−1
2 < ℎ almost always holds and we obtain the 
proposition.  
 
Here, we derive the following empirical hypothesis: 
The implementation of information disclosure ordinances reduces the income of local government 
chief executives. Then, the income reduces as time passes since the implementation of the 
                                                   
inequality aversion hypothesis, as the mayor or chief executive’s income was available to 
the public without the information disclosure ordinance. Therefore, the degree of inequality 
aversion may not change before and after the implementation of the ordinance. 
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ordinance. 
 
4. Data and Estimation 
4.1. Data 
 
Table 1 presents the variables used in this paper along with the means and standard deviations 
for the data employed. To obtain the detailed data of the year of implementation of the information 
disclosure ordinances for 1,727 local governments, we made a request to the Autonomous 
Administrative Office. From these data, we can calculate the years after the implementation to 
examine its effect on the income of local government chief executives. That is, if the ordinance 
was implemented in 2000 for a town, 1, 2, 3 years have passed for the town by 2001, 2002 and 
2003, respectively. In addition, following Toyokeizai (2014), we obtained income level data for 
chief executives and local government officers, local government revenue, and population for 
1999–2010. Unfortunately, data prior to 1999 were not available. Regarding other available 
variables, they did not cover the whole period and so the variables used in this paper are limited 
to capture the basic economic condition of local governments.  
There was the boom period in municipal mergers in Japan, collectively known as the Heisei 
Municipal Mergers. As a consequence, the number of local governments reduced from 3,232 in 
1999 to 1,727 in 2010. However, as of 2004, the number of local governments totaled 3,132, 
meaning that there were very few mergers between 1999 and 2004. Many mergers occurred in 
2005–2006, with the merging of approximately 1,300 local governments. However, following 
Toyokeizai (2014), we were only able to obtain data concerning chef executives in local 
government that survived during this period and absorbed other local governments. Hence, the 
dataset consists of approximately 1,700 local governments for 1999–2010. Figure 1 shows a 
smooth increase in the number of local governments that implemented the ordinance before the 
2005. In contrast, Figure 2(b) shows that the income of chief executives declined before 2005. 
Accordingly, the decline in income is likely to be influenced by the implementation of the 
ordinance rather than the mergers. Information regarding the implementation of the ordinance is 
matched with other variables to construct an original dataset.    
 
4.2. Method 
 
As presented in the hypothesis in Section 3, the aim of this paper is to investigate how the 
implementation of information disclosure ordinances influences citizens’ evaluations of local 
government chief executives. The panel structure of the dataset enables us to control for the 
unobservable time-invariant factors of the local governments. Therefore, we can control for 
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various factors using a fixed effects model even though the number of independent variables is 
limited. The estimated function takes the following form: 
 
Ln(Chief’s income)it = 1 Open dummy i(t-1) + 2 Years from openi(t-1) + 3 Ln(Local Revenue) i(t-1) 
+ 4 Ln(Population) i(t-1) + kt +ui + εit,                                                       
 
where the dependent variable is the log form of the chief executive’s monthly income. In an 
alternative specification, as a robustness check, the dependent variable is the chief executive’s 
relative income (average chief executive’s income level/average income level of other 
government officers). Furthermore, Ln(Chief’s income)it in prefecture i and year t, and 1 
represents the regression parameters. The unobservable fixed effects in local government i are 
represented by ui. The variable kt represents the specific effects for year t, which is captured by 
dummy variables that control for macro-level shocks in Japan. Additionally, εit is the error term. 
Key independent variables are Open dummy i(t-1) and Years from openi(t-1): Open dummy is 1 if the 
information disclosure ordinance is enacted for local government i, otherwise , and Years from 
open is the number of years since the ordinance was enacted. If an ordinance was not enacted, 
Years from open is 0.  
As mentioned earlier, the Heisei Municipal Mergers occurred during the studied period. As a 
result of the mergers, the size of local governments drastically increased as local governments 
merged. Ryan et al. (2002) argued that the scale of government is the key factor to promote 
information disclosure relating to the government. The economic scale of the local governments 
is captured by including Ln(Local Revenue) i(t-1) and Ln(Population) i(t-1). These variables are 
incorporated to control for the scale of local government and therefore the impact of the merger. 
Thanks to the scale economy, a larger government can pay a chief executive more. Hence, the 
coefficients of Ln(Local Revenue) i(t-1) and Ln(Population) i(t-1) are predicted to be positive. The 
values of these independent variables are in year t-1 because they are thought to have an effect on 
the chief executive’s income in the following year. Thus, there is a 1-year lag between the 
dependent and independent variables. In addition, researchers have found that political factors are 
related to government disclosure (Giroux 1999; Cheng 1992). In our model, we assume that the 
fixed effect for each local government is considered to capture the political factors. The data 
comprised approximately 1,700 local governments and covered 12 years from 1999–2010. Using 
the sample, we conducted the estimations. Furthermore, to reduce the effect of the Heisei 
Municipal Mergers, we also conducted the estimations based on the sub-sample (limited to 1999–
2004), which is prior to 2005 and 2006 when a large number of mergers occurred.  
From the hypothesis raised in the previous section, we predict the value of Open dummy and 
Years from open to be negative. In addition, to enable a closer inspection of government 
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accountability, we incorporate cross terms for a dummy for the top 25% incomes of chief 
executives in 1999 and the key variables Open dummy and Years from open. A relatively high 
income among chief executives might be regarded as excessive and inequality aversion may play 
a role in reducing their income. If so, the cross terms are expected to have negative coefficients. 
These are also predicted to be statistically insignificant, suggesting that government 
accountability plays a reasonably greater role than inequality aversion.  
 
4.3. Estimation results 
  
 Table 2 shows the estimation results based on the full sample in columns (1) and (2), and those 
for the sub-sample in columns (3) and (4). We were unable to obtain population data for some 
local governments and so the inclusion of the population variable reduced the sample size. We 
see from Table 2 that Open dummy and Years from open are negative in all columns. With the 
exception of Open dummy in column (4), they are statistically significant. Notably, Years from 
open is significant at the 1% level in columns (1)–(4). This is in line with our prediction. Looking 
at column (2), we see that the absolute values of coefficients of Open dummy and Years from open 
are 0.006. This implies that in comparison with a chief executive’s income before the 
implementation of the ordinance, his or her income was reduced by 0.6%. That is, after the first 
year of implementation, the income was reduced by 0.6%. Considering both effects together, after 
the second year following implementation, the income was reduced by 1.2 %. Thus, after 2 years, 
the income was reduced by 1.8%.  
Consistent with our prediction, control variables such as Ln(Local Revenue) and 
Ln(Population) tend to be positive and statistically significant. This implies that larger 
municipalities can spend more on its chief executive’s salary partly because of scale economy. 
The coefficients can be interpreted as demonstrating elasticity because both the dependent 
variable and these variables are in log form. As for column (2), the absolute value of Ln(Local 
Revenue) is 0.12, which implies that a 1% increase in local government revenue results in 0.12% 
increase in its chief executive’s income. Furthermore, the absolute value of Ln(Population) is 0.14, 
which implies that a 1% increase in population size results in a 0.14% increase in the income of 
the chief executive. 
To examine the relative income level of chief executives compared with average income of 
other local government officers, we turn to Table 3, which presents the results of the alternative 
specification where the relative chief executive’s income (chief executive’s income/average 
income of other officers) is the dependent variable. Similar to the results in Table 2, the 
coefficients of Open dummy and Years from open are negative and statistically significant in all 
columns, which is in line with our prediction. From the sub-sample results in column (4), we see 
10 
 
that the absolute value of Open dummy is 0.012. This implies that compared with the relative 
income level before the implementation of the ordinance, the gap between the chief executive’s 
income and the average income of other local government officers reduced by 1.2%. Furthermore, 
the absolute value of Years from open is 0.008. This can be interpreted as suggesting that the gap 
was reduced by 0.8% after 1 year. Considering both effects together, in the second year after the 
implementation of the ordinance, the gap was reduced by 2.0%. Thus, after 2 years from 
implementation, the gap was reduced by 2.8%. This effect is considered to be reasonable and 
sizable. 
What has been observed thus far reveals that the results of the key variables, Open dummy and 
Years from open, are almost the same in the estimations regardless of the samples and 
specifications. The combined results of Tables 2 and 3 strongly support the hypothesis proposed 
in section 3. 
We made a local government dummy where its chief executive’s income was in the top 25% 
in 1999 among all local government chief executives. We then look at it interaction with the key 
variables. The results are presented in Table 4. The signs of the interaction terms varied and were 
not statistically significant. Hence, a reduction of the chief executive’s income was mainly 
considered as a result of greater accountability rather than inequality aversion. This result satisfies 
Gibrat’s law (Gibrat 1931) where the income growth rate is independent of the initial income. 
This result differs from Mas’s (2017) finding that the wage cuts in public sector following the 
introduction of a pay disclosure policy in California was mainly due to inequality aversion. 
However, this difference is plausible because the incomes of Japanese mayors and chief 
executives were available to the public even before the implementation of the ordinance. In 
contrast, the salaries of the Californian officials were not available to the public before the 
implementation of the pay disclosure policy. In the case of Japan, as the mayors and chief 
executives’ incomes had been available to the public before the ordinance implementation, 
inequality aversion may not come into play even where the ordinance is implemented. 
Furthermore, inequality aversion may be a more significant issue in the United States than in 
Japan. As Giertz (2007) points out, income inequality has grown over the past three decades in 
the United States.8 The share of total annual income received by the top 1% has more than 
doubled from 9% in 1976 to 20% in 2011 (Piketty and Saez 2003; Alvaredo et al. 2013; Piketty 
2013). An increase in income concentration in the top income group is thought to increase the 
likelihood of inequality aversion in the United States. However, in Japan, the top 1% share has 
remained around 10% since 1970 and is considered relatively stable (Moriguchi and Saez 2008; 
                                                   
8 It is for this reason that the city of Portland in the United States has recently 
implemented a special punitive corporate tax for companies were the chief executive 
officers’ compensation is more than 100 times that of the median workers (Forbes, 2016). 
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Alvaredo et al. 2013; Piketty 2013). Hence, in comparison with the United States, the Japanese 
people place a greater importance on government accountability rather than inequality aversion. 
Over all, the reason why our finding differs from Mas’s (2017) can be explained by the 
differences in the institutional setting and income inequality between Japan and the United 
States.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Compared with other countries, a larger amount of tax revenue is spent on public works in 
Japan (Doi and Ihori 2009). To ensure the smooth running of Japanese society, it is essential that 
the levels of effectiveness and efficiency in the public sectors be increased. To improve 
government efficiency, transparency policies are considered necessary to increase accountability. 
In the United States, the salaries of government officers have recently became available to the 
public, and this has led to a reduction in the total payroll (Mas 2017). In the case of Japan, the 
salaries of chief executives in local governments were already available to the public, while their 
work performance was not sufficiently transparent. In this situation, people were unable to 
evaluate whether their salaries reasonably reflected their performance. To increase the level of 
transparency surrounding local government, information disclosure ordinances were widely 
implemented between 1998 and 2007. As a consequence, citizens were finally able to obtain 
sufficient information to evaluate the performances of local government chief executives to 
determine whether their salaries were reasonable and acceptable.  
This paper attempts to investigate the influence of information disclosure ordinances on the 
income of mayors and chief executives in local government, and how it changes as time goes by. 
We found that the income of chief executives declined after the implementation of information 
disclosure ordinances. Furthermore, as the years passed, the income fell further. This is in line 
with the prediction derived from the simple theoretical model suggested in this paper. According 
to the case of the United States used here to examine transparency policy, the shrinking of public 
officers’ incomes can be explained by societal inequality aversion rather than the effect of making 
public officials accountable (Mas 2017). In contrast, in Japan, citizens already could obtain 
information about the salaries of public officials before the ordinance. Furthermore, the value of 
a chief executive’s income in the initial year does not influence the effect of the information 
disclosure ordinance. If inequality aversion caused citizens to reduce the income of the chief 
executive, its reduction depends on whether it appears excessive, regardless of whether or not it 
actually is. This does not hold in Japan. All in all, transparency reduces the chief executive’s 
income because of an increase in accountability. 
The data used in this paper may suffer from endogeneity bias because a local government with 
12 
 
greater accountability was more likely to implement the ordinance earlier. Furthermore, income 
inequality in society seems to provide a different motivation to reduce the income of chief 
executives even if the outcome of the information disclosure is the same. Unfortunately, we 
cannot investigate this issue using the survey data. Hence, it is necessary to conduct further 
experiments to scrutinize this mechanism.  
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Figure 1. Rate of municipalities enacting information disclosure ordinances 
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Figure 2(a). Average monthly income of chief executives in local government 
 
 
Figure 2(b). Relative income of chief executives in local government 
 
Note: Chief executives’ average income/average income of other government officers 
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Figure 3(a). Distribution of average income of chief executives in local government  
 
Figure 3(b). Distribution of relative income of chief executives in local government  
  
Note: Chief executives’ average income/average income level of other government officers 
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Table 1. Definition and basic statistics of variables used 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Chief executive’s income (thousand yen) 798 147 
Rate of chief executive’s income 
(Chief ’s income/Officer’s income) 
2.45 0.41 
Open dummy 0.72 0.44 
Years from Open 5.00 5.11 
Local Revenue 
(value in the previous year: million yen) 
296 816 
Population (thousand) 73.3 18.3 
Note: values are based on the full sample, 1999–2010. 
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Table 2. Regression results of fixed effects model  
Dependent variable is Ln(Chief ’s Income) 
 (1)  
1999–2010 
(2) 
1999–2010 
(3) 
1999–2004 
(4) 
1999–2004 
Open dummy −0.008*** 
(−3.02) 
−0.006** 
(−2.36) 
−0.004** 
(−2.00) 
−0.003 
(−1.56) 
Years from Open −0.005*** 
(−4.89) 
−0.006*** 
(−5.26) 
−0.003*** 
(−3.27) 
−0.004*** 
(−4.37) 
Ln(Local Revenue)  0.15*** 
(15.2) 
0.12*** 
(11.5) 
0.006 
(0.71) 
−0.003 
(-0.32) 
Ln(Population)  
 
0.14*** 
(7.32) 
 
 
0.19*** 
(6.47) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-square 0.35 0.38 0.10 0.11 
Observations 18,865 17,096 7,229 7,224 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Values in parentheses are t-values based on robust standard errors. 
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Table 3. Regression results of fixed effects model  
Dependent variable is Rate of Chief Executive’s Income 
 (1)  
1999–2010 
(2) 
1999–2010 
(3) 
1999–2004 
(4) 
1999–2004 
Open dummy −0.029*** 
(−4.64) 
−0.023*** 
(−3.80) 
−0.014** 
(−2.50) 
−0.012** 
(−2.13) 
Years from Open −0.012*** 
(−4.61) 
−0.014*** 
(−5.21) 
−0.006* 
(−1.94) 
−0.008*** 
(−2.71) 
Ln(Local Revenue)  0.398*** 
(16.8) 
0.338*** 
(14.3) 
0.028 
(1.47) 
0.010 
(0.54) 
Ln(Population)  
 
0.289*** 
(7.24) 
 
 
0.409*** 
(5.34) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-square 0.31 0.35 0.18 0.18 
Observations 18,856 17,088 7,227 7,222 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Values in parentheses are t-values based on robust standard errors. 
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Table 4. Regression results of fixed effects model, 1999–2004  
Examining the effects of top 25% income group in 1999 (the initial year)  
 (1)  
Ln(Chief ’s 
Income) 
(2) 
Ln(Chief ’s 
Income) 
(3) 
Rate of Chief 
executive’s 
Income 
(4) 
Rate of Chief ’s 
executive’s 
Income 
Open dummy −0.002 
(−0.73) 
−0.002 
(−0.59) 
−0.009 
(−1.42) 
−0.008 
(−1.31) 
Open dummy 
   *top 25% dummy 
−0.008 
(−1.48) 
−0.008 
(−1.62) 
−0.01 
(0.72) 
−0.01 
(0.82) 
Years from Open −0.004*** 
(−3.45) 
−0.005*** 
(−3.71) 
−0.009** 
(−2.57) 
−0.009*** 
(−2.76) 
Years from Open 
   *top 25% dummy 
0.002 
(1.54) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.007 
(1.45) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
Ln(Local Revenue) 
Ln(Population) 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Within R-square 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.19 
Observations 7,324 7,229 7,227 7,222 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Values in parentheses are t-values based on robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable are Ln(Chief ’s Income) in columns (1)–(2) and Rate of Chief 
Executive’s Income in columns (3)–(4). Sample covers the period 1999–2004. Year 
dummies are included in all columns. 
 
 
 
